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Svstem.The gains and difficulties Latin American countries face from financial market
development and liberalisation have received much attention in current econornic
literature.  Nevertheless,  several significant issues  have received little  or no attention,
even  though  the success  of these  efforts depends  upon them. The purpose  of this paper
is to explore the benefits from open and developed - I do not assume  that they are
necessarily  synonymous  - financial and capital markets in I-atin America and possible
important obstacles  which will be faced  in the remainder  of the 1990s.
Despite  the irnportance  of financial  liberalisation,  trade liberalisation  is the
central policy of any liberalisation effort.  Moreover, the usual arguments  favoring
financial liberalisation  stem only from the benefits  of this policy in and of itself.' The
usual  conclusion  is that trade liberalisation  leads  capital account  liberalisation. It is not
fully appreciated that financial liberalisation and privatisation are not only complements,
but necessary  complements  to trade liberalisation.  One could (and should)  write a
number of volumes  developing  au rigor this proposition. Since  this is beyond  the scope
of the present  study,  however,  I will leave  the motivation  for the proposition  at an
'intuitive lerrel;  in a liberalised  environment,  domestic  tradable  goods  producers  will be
left at a comparative disadvantage  if non-tradable inputs to production are not supplied
efficiently.  The first part of this paper presents  some evidence of the gains in the
'Sebastian  Edwards,  "On the Timing and Speed  if Economic  Liberalization in
Developing  Countries,"  in Michael Connally  and Claudio Gonzales-Vega,  eds.  (1987):
Economic  Reform and Stabilization  in l-atin America. (New York, l987);Sebastian
Edwards  and Sweder  Van Wijnbergen,  "The Welfare Effects  of Trade and Capital
Market Liberalization,"  International  Economic  Review,  Yol.27, No. 1 (1986);  and the
country  analyses  contained  in Demetris  Papageorgiou,  Michael Michaely,  and Armeane
M. Choksi,  Liberalizing  Foreign  Trade. Vol. 1 and 4 (Cambridge,  1991).efficiency of financial intermediation that a more liberal financial environment brings.
The linl< between privatisation and liberalisation will  be taken up later in the paper.
The recent moves toward economic opening comes not only at the end of a long
period of failed real sector  adjustment  to the debt crisis,  but even  previous  moves  toward
opening were failures.  To understand why, however, we should examine not the real
sector, but the financial sector.  The debt crisis created a hinderance to liberalisation.
In fact, the first reaction  to the disappearance  of external  credit in the 1980s  was  to
increase  trade protection. It also  put severe  stress  on domestic  financial markets  because
of the increase  in public sector  bonowing requirements.  I have  argued  elsewhere  that
this internal and external transfer problem presented a severe obstacle to financial and
capital  market opening.' The reduction  of this burden through the long process  through
the Brady Plan restructurings  has  improved  the prospects  for further liberalisation  of
both trade and financial markets.  One could argue that the debt burden itself was not
important and that liberalisation  has  occurred  because  of the promise  of debt relief.
Either way, however, the Brady Plan has been critical to the opening taking place in
I-atin America.'
Will  the curent  capital flow to Latin America end in a crisis like that of the
'John H. Welch, "Debt Servicing and Its Impact on Financial Markets in I-arin
America,"  in Werner Baer and Donald V. Coes,  eds.,  United States  Policies  and the
I-atin American Economies,  (New York, 1990).
3This  does not mean that internal adjustment such as fiscal reform and monetary
policy to reduce inflation.  These are central to t atin America's recovery.  For more on
this chronolory,  see  Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas,  "Economic  Liberalization in the
Americas,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas 1991  Amual  Report (Dallas, 1992).1970s? Hopefully  not.  So far, I-atin America's participation in international capital
markets  in the 1990s  does  not resemble  that of the 1970s.  The pattern of the new
capital flows to latin  America no longer takes the exclusive  form of bank loans.
Securities,  both stocks  and bonds,  figure importantly  as  instruments  in the intermediation
of this capital flow.  Domestic  and international  investors  are now interested  in Iatin
American equities markets.  The transformation which needs to take place in I-atin
America for this type of model to efficiently  propel the Latin American economies  into
sustained recovery is nothing short of revolutionary.  The nature of this transformation
will be the main subject  of this paper staxting  with a description  of the current state  of
financial markets  in Latin America.
Financial Markets in Latin America in th€ L980s
Why did earlier liberalisation fail?  Much has been made of the financial trauma
which followed trade and financial  liberalisations  in the Southern  Cone countries  of
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.o One explanation for the failures involved the lack of
''consistent  fiscal adjustment,  especially  in the case  of Argentina (Rodriguez  1982). If the
government runs a fiscal deficit, it will  have to finance it by printing money or by issuing
bonds. Both tend to raise  domestic  interest  rates  which lead to unstable  capital  flows. If
money  growth finances  the deficit, the consequent  increase  in inflation will put pressure
nSee  Sebastian  Edwards  and Alejandra Cox-Edwards,  Monetarism  and Liberalization:
The Chilean  Experiment,  (New York, 1987)  and Vittorio Corbo,  Jaime de Melo, and
James Tybout, "What Went Wrong in the Southern Cone?" Economic Developrnent and
Cultural Change,  Vol.34, No. 3 (1985).on the exchange  rate. For these  reasons,  fiscal  balance  is seen  as a precondition  for
financial liberalisation.  Lack of fiscal reform, however, as an explanation for the
liberalisation  failures  in the Southern  Cone  is clearly  insufficient.s  The liberalisation
programme in Chile, for example, did not avoid a financial collapse in spite of the fact
the central government budget had moved into surplus at the beginning of it
liberalisation programme but a financial collapse still ensued.
Others focus on the lack of credibility the exchange  rate regime.  The exchange
rate was used to bring down inflation by steadily decreasing  the rate of crawl to zero and
establishing a fixed exchange  rate.  The fixed exchange  rate would then act as a nominal
anchor for the price level.  I-ack of credibility in the exchange  rate regime led to a
consumption  boom - so the story  goes  - , large capital inflows,  a large real appreciation,
and a large trade deficit.  Because  people believe that the govemment will  fix the
exchange  rate only temporarily,  they consume  more goods  - especially  foreign goods  -
before the devaluation.  Expectations of an impending devaluation then causes  the
capital inflow to reverse  and a run on the central  bank ensues.  People  protect
themselves  from the devaluation by moving en masse  into dollar denominated assets.
This explanation  places  heavy  weight on the credibility of government  macroeconomic
policy and on strong  intertemporal  substitution  in consumption  - that people are seruitive
to changes  in the price of consuming  now rather than later.6 The latter is crucial  to
T.oque B. Fernandez, "The Expectations Management Approach to Stabilization in
Argentina During 1976-1982,"  World Developmenr,  Vol. 13,  No. 8, (August 1985).
"See  Maurice Obstfeld  "The Capital Inflows Problem  Revisited:  A Stylized  Model of
Southern  Cone  Disinflation,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  Yol. 52 (1985);  Guillermo A.generating  a consumption-import  boom and real appreciation.
The ernpirical  evidence  on the sensitivity  of present  consumption  to the.
opportunity costs of consuming tomoffow is rnixed.  Although Giovannini found weak or
no intertemporal  substitution in consumption in I-atin America, recent evidence in fact
does." Arrau  and van Wijnbergen and Arrau present evidence of significant substitution
in Chile and Mexico  when changes  in the real value of individual's  assets  are taken into
account.8 The overall evidence, however, does not clearly support lack of credibility of
macroeconomic  policy being  the primal cause  of the collapse  of these  programmes.  But
credibility,  or lack thereof,  is important to the success  or failure in these  and other
stabilisation  programmes  in I-atin America.
The neo-structuralist critique emphasised  the importance of working capital costs
due to high interest  rates  on short  term loans  on the supply  side  and the fact that black
markets could serve as more efficient allocators of credit than the formal
Calvo and Carlos A  Vdgh, "Credibility and the Dynamics of Stabilization Policy: A Basic
Framework,"  mimeo, International  Monetary  Fund, September  1986;  and Darryl Mcl-eod
and John H. Welch, "Fixed  Dollar Exchange  Rates  in [atin  America: Costs  and
Benefits,"  rnimeo,  Federal  Reserve  Bank of Dallas,  August 1992.
TAlberto Giovannini, "saving and the Real Interest Rate in LDCs," Journal of
Development  Economics,  Vol. 18 (1985).
Tatricio  Arrau, "Intertemporal Substitution in a Monetary Framework: Evidence
from Chile and Mexico,"  Working Paper  549,  the World Bank, (December  1990)  and
Patricio  Arrau and Sweder  van Wijnbergen,  "Intertemporal  Substitution,  Risk Aversion,
and Private  Savings  in Mexico,"  Working Paper  682,  the World Bank, (May 1991).banking system.e  Further, the existence  of (required) reserves  in the formal banking
sector,  under a programme  of interest  rate liberalisation,  could cause  a reduction  in
credit as individuals substituted curb market loans for bank deposits in their balance
sheets.  Banks  would not be able to lend all of their new resources  in loans  because  they
had to keep a certain  proportion in reserve  at the central  bank. Credit supply  would fall
and the rise in interest rates would raise the cost of working capital.  Output would
decline  and to the extent  that this interest  cost  increase  could  be passed  on into higher
prices,  inflation would rise. Interest  rate liberalisation  could lead to higher inflation and
lower output, the opposite  of what McKinnon and Shaw  had originally  hypothesised.'o
The conclusions  of the neo-structuralists  have  been called  into question. For
example, Buffie shows  that if financial markets are sufficiently open - if  dornestic
residents  can  hold foreign  bonds  - the contractionary  effects  of interest  rate liberalisation
disappear  because  a shift from foreign  bonds  to deposits  may increase  credit supply."
More recently,  Kapur has  shown  that the neo-structuralist  models  do not treat the role of
'See Sweder  van Wijnbergen,  "Interest  Rate Management  in LDCs," Journal of
Development  Economics,  Vol. 12  (1983). Also see  James  A. Hanson  and Roberto de
Rezende  Rocha,  "High Interest  Rates,  Spreads,  and the Costs  of Intermediation,"  World
Bank Industry  and Finance  Paper  No. 18 (1986),  James  A. Hanson  and Craig R. Neal,
"Interest  Rate Policies  in Selected  Developing  Countries,"  World Bank Industry  and
Finance  Paper  No. 14 (1986),  and S6rgio  Pereira  l-eite and V. Sundavarajan,  "Issues  in
Interest  Rate Management  and Liberalization  " IMF Staff Papers,  Vol. 37, No. 4,
(December  1990).
'R.onald I. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic  Development  (Washington
D.C., 1973)  and Edward S. Shaw,  (1973):  Financial  Deepenine  in Economic
Development.  (New Yor(  1973).
"Edward F. Buffie, "Financial  Repression,  the New Structuralists,  and Stabilization
Policy  in Semi-Industrialized  Econornies,"  Journal of DeveloBment  Economics,  Vol. 14
(1984).bank reserves  and the role of consumption  loans  correctly." He shows  that productive
credit may increase  because  households  accumulate  bank deposits  and decrease  their
demand for consumption loans as a result of higher formal sector interest rates.  Kapur
also establishes  that financial liberalisation unambiguously increases  welfare.
Overall, the evidence  to date tends to favor the credibility  arguments outlined
above. Other structural  reasons  may explain  the collapse,  however. Cho, extending  the
work of Stiglitz and Weiss,  feels  that the problems  of adverse  selection  and moral hazard
in credit markets may have been a large contributor, especially when equities markets
are small or do not exist.l3  When credit markets  display  adverse  selectiorg  increases  in
interest  rates  ration out safe  projects  from getting  credit leaving  only the riskiest  projects.
A rise in interest  rates  increases  the riskiness  of the loan portfolio of the consolidated
financial system. Similarly, moral hazard problems increase  the riskiness of the financial
system. Moral  hazard arises  because  deposit insurance or the fact that the government
will  intervene in financial institutions to save  the value of deposits. Such situations lead
bank managers  to take on more risk.
The combination of these two effects can be devastating  to a financial system
undergoing  liberalisation. According  to Cho, the rise in interest  rates  leads  to an
'Basant I(  Kapur, "Formal and Informal Financial Markets, and the Neo-
Structuralist Critique of the Financial Liberalization  Strategr in l,ess Developed
Countries,"  Journal of Development  Economics,  Vol. 3S  (1992).
"Yoon Je Cho, "Inefficiencies  from Financial  Liberalization  in the Absence  of Well-
Functioning  Equity Markets,"  Journal of Money.  Credit. and Bankin& Vol. 18,  No. 2,
(May 1986)  and Joseph  E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss  (1981):  "Credit Rationing in
Markets  with Imperfect  Information  " American  Economic  Review.  Vol. 71, (June 1981).increase  in the riskiness  of the loan profile of the banking  system  because  safe  bonowers
are rationed out of the market.  The financial system  becomes  very wlnerable  to any
type of shock,  e.g.  adverse  terms of trade changes.  Ironically,  the liberalisation  does  not
completely  eliminate credit rationing  because  at sufficiently  high interest  rates,  the
additional risk causes  bank'  expected  profits to be lower.  This is compounded by the
fact that firms have no alternative place to find capital resources  for investment. Hence,
Cho urges that stock markets be developed in along with the financial system.
Policymakers in I-atin America seem to heeding this advise as stock markets have
become  a major focus. The problem with Cho's  policy conclusions,  however,  is that
stock markets are rarely used as primary sources  of capital.  Hence, stock markets are
useful  mainly as  a market for corporate  control and for conditioning  the liability
structure  of corporations. In prior work, I looked at the structure  of debt and equity
financing in latin  America and its relevance to financial development.'o I also
described  a scenario  similar to Cho's  but in one that explains  why the stock  market is
underdeveloped;  firms resist  issuing  equity for reasons  discussed  later. Financial
''  liberalisation leads to an expansion  financed mainly by debt, increasing debt equity ratios
to dangerous  levels. Any shocks  leave  the financial system  in severe  difficulties. I
extend this discussion  in order to examine the viability  of the new revitalisation of Latin
American financial systens  which puts increasing  emphasis  on equities  markets.
Before doing so, however, I will  compare the state of financial markets in
countries  which pursued  a more liberal financial  strategy  to those  that have  not.
'nWelch,'Debt  Servicing.'Argentina Chile, Colombia,  Uruguay,  and Venezuela  substantially  liberalised  their
financial market in the late 1970s.r' The reforms in Argentina" unlike the others -
especially Chile, and Uruguay -, did not survive the financial turmoil  of the early 1980s
and the liberalisation  programme  waq for all intents  and purposes,  completely  reversed
starting  in 1982. Also, attempts  in the mid-1980s  to reimpose  interest  rate controls  in
Colombia and Venezuela proved impossible to maintain and more liberal interest rate
policy returned after 1989.1u
Ecuador  commenced  on a gradual  liberalisation  of its financial system  in 1982,
first freeing interest rates and then decreasing  the barriers to entry in the financial
services  sector  in 1985."  Peru undertook  modest  liberalizing  policies  in the late 1970s
and early 1980s  especially  with the creation  of dollar denominated  marketable  bank
certificates  of deposit.'* But the heterodox  experiment  after 1985  reintroduced  a large
"See  Edwards  and Cox-Edwards,  Monetarism  and Liberalisation.  for Chile, Corbo et
al, 'What Went Wrong?',  for Argentina,  Chile, and Uruguay,  Jorge  Garcia Garcia,
(1991):  "Colombia,"  in Demetris  Papageorgiou,,  Michael Michaely,  and Armeane M.
Choksi  Uberalizing Foreign Trade, Volume 4 (Cambridge,  1991)  and Rudolf Hommes,
"Colombia," in John Williamson, Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has
Happened?  (Washington  D.C.: 1990)  for Colombia,  and Ricardo Hausmann,
"Venezuela,"  in  John Williamson,  Latin American  Adjustment:  How Much Has
Happened?  (Washington  D.C., 1990)  for Venezuela.
'uColombia  maintained  significant  barriers  to entry in financial services  in the 1980s
in spite of more or less  market determined  interest  rates.
"See Alain de Janvry,  Elizabeth Sadoulet,  and Andrd Fargeix,  "Politicalty  Feasible
and Equitable Adjustrnent: Some Altematives for Ecuador," World Development, VoL
19,  No. 11 (1991)  and Alain de Janvry,  Elizabeth  Sadoulet,  and Andr6 Fargeix,
Adjustment  and Equity in Ecuador.  (Paris,  1991).
'"See  Paul Beckerman, "Inflation  and Dollar  Accounts in Peru's Banking System,
1970-82,'World  Development,  Vol. 15,  No. 8 (1987).number of restrictions  especially  after the nationalisation  of the banks  in 1987."
Bolivian financial markets, in spite of the stxong  orthodox stabilisation programme
pursued  in the mid-1980s  and the opening  of the capital account  of the balance  of
payments,  have  not witnessed  an increase  in competition,  a reduction  in the spread
between lending and borrowing rates, nor a substantial remonetisation of the economy,a
The financial system  has yet to recover from the hyperinflation of 1984-85. Although
interest  rates  were allowed  to rise to positive  levels  in real terms in the 1980s,  the
market still remains substantially segmented,
Brazil combined  an institution  building approach  with a moderately  liberal
financial policy through formal inflation  indexation of financial assets  starting in the late
1960s." The difficulties  financial indexation  has  created  for the Brazilians  are well
known and are witnessed  by the several  failed attempts  at de-indexation  in the 1980s.
Although Brazilian financial technology is very sophisticated,  a severe  lack of
competition  keeps  the cost  of intermediation  high. Significant  barriers  to entry in
financial services  still exist,  Further. one of the main sources  of srowth for the financial
'eFor  a good comparison  of the two periods,  see  Manuel Pastor,  Jr. and Carol Wise,
"Peruvian  Economic  Policy  in the 1980s:  From Orthodoxy  to Heterodoxy  and Bach"
I-atin American Research  Review,  Yol.27, No. 2 (1992). Also see  Daniel Schydlowsky,
"The Peruvian  Debacle:  Economic  Dynamics  or Political Causes?".  Mimeo. Boston
University (1989).
'See Juan Antonio  Morales, "The Transition from Stabilization to Sustained  Growth
in Bolivi4" in Michael Bruno, et al, l,essons  of Economic  Stabilization  and Its
Aftermath. (Cambridge,  1991)  and Felipe Morris, et al, "Latin America's  Banking
Systems  in the 1980s:  A Cross  Country  Comparison,"  World Bank Discussion  Paper  No.
81  (1990).
"See John H. Welch, Capital Markets  and the Development  Process:  The Case  of
Brazil, (I-ondon, 1992).
10system  was the market for indexed government bonds.  The large growth of the Brazilian
government's  internal debt and a liquidity confiscation  and partial repudiation  in 1990  -
the so-called  Collor Plan - have seriously  hindered  the efficiency  of Brazilian financial
institutions in allocating resources  effectively.
Mexico's financial system  developed in a relatively liberalised environment until
the bank nationalisation in 1982. The bank nationalisation temporarily reversed the
importance of universal banking, the major development of the 1970s,  because  of
perceived  abuses.  The recent  privatisation  of the banks  has  necessarily  dismantled  some
of the firewalls erected under government ownership. Universal banking once again is at
the heart of the Mexican banking system. Although banks can own (or be owned by)
brokerage  houses  and insurance  companies,  they still are not allowed  to hold stocks  in
industrial firms.  Further, Mexican authorities fully liberalised interest rates in  1989  and
since  have  reduced  reserve  requirements  and  barriers  to entry in money  and capital
markets. The planned  opening  of the market for financial services,  especially  in the
North American Free Trade Agreement, will  add dynarnism  to the already fervent
activity in Mexican financial markets.z
Increasing evidence indicates that financial stance and inflation  rates significantly
determine the size and cost efficiency of financial systems. A larger degree of openness
and low inflation  rates are associated  with larser and less costlv financial svstems. Table
"See Banco de Mexico, The Mexican Economy, (Mexico City, 1992) and Marilyn  E.
Skiles, "Structural Change in Mexico and the Prospects  for Financial Integration with the
U.S.,"  paper presented  at the 66d  Annual Western  Economic  Association  International
Conference,  Seattle  (July 1991).
111 presents a cofirmon if flawed measure  of financial market size - the ratio of M, to gross
domestic  product (GDP).  The more open financial  markets  of Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela are larger than the more protected financial
markets of Argentina" Brazil, and Bolivia.
Inflation  rates (Table 2) also determine the size of the financial markets.  The
economies  which suffered  the highest  inflation rates  in the 1980s,  Argentina,  Brazil, and
Bolivia, have the smallest financial markets compared to the more moderate inflation
countries of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The efficiency  of these  financial systems  in terms of production  of M, sewices  can
be gauged somewhat  by an index which appears  in Table 3.  The data are meant to
indicate  the cost of intermediation  per unit of M, by dividing M, by the value added  in
financial services.  The larger the indicator,  the smaller  the cost  of intermediation  and
the more efficient the financial system. The countries which maintained a more
liberalised financial environment and lower inflation  rates such as Colombi4  Chile,
Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela"  with the exception of Argentina, showed
more efficient financial intermediation than Brazil, Bolivia, and Peru.  I am suspicious  of
the meaning of both the exceedingly  high number for Argentina and the low number for
Brazil.  The high number for Argentina is more a function of the low value added due to
low profits and in many cases  negative net v/orth of Argentine banks than of their
efficiency. Brazil's low number  reflects  inefficiency  and exorbitant  profits of Brazilian
intermediaries  but is biased  downward  due to the large importance  of non-monetary
instruments in their financial svstem.
t2On the whole, these  simple  numbers  point to a clear conclusion:  countries  that
can weather the difficulties associated  with financial liberalisation, difficulties even the
United  States  could not avoid, will  end up with a more efficient financial system.a A
more irnportant questiotr"  however, is: what difference does this make to growth and
welfare?
No matter the unresolved issues  surrounding financial liberalisation, market
oriented financial markets increase  financial saving. If increased intermediation between
savings  and investment  decisions  could increase  the quality of investment  by allocating
scarce  savings  to their best  uses,  the improvement  in growth could  be substantial.
Recent  theoretical  and empirical evidence  suggests  financial "repression"  could
have large deleterious affects on output growth.a  For example, Roubini  and Sala-i-
Martin build on recent  endogenous  growth  models  developed  by Romer and Bencivenga
and Smith by incorporating and testing whether financial repression hinders economic
growth.'  Interestingly, they find that financial repression  in Latin America goes far in
aI made this same  point in Welch,  'Debt Servicing.'
'See World Banlg World Development  Report 1989.  (New York 1989), Nouriel
Roubini and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "Financial Development, the Trade Regime, and
Economic  Growth,"  NBER Working Paper  No.3876  (October 1991),  Nouriel Roubini
and Xavier Sala-i-Martin, "A Growth Model of Inflation,  Tax Evasion, and Financial
Repression,"  NBER Working Paper  No. 4062  (May 1992),  Nouriel Roubini and Xavier
Sala-i-Martin,  "Financial  Repression  and Economic  Growth,' Journal of Development
Economics,  Vol. 39, No.1 (1992),  and Jos€  de Gregorio, (1992):  "Economic  Growth in
I-atin America,"  Journal of Development  Economics,  Vol 39 (1992).
oPaul A  Romer, "Increasing  Retums and l-ong Run Growh,"  Journal of Political
Economy,  Vol.94  (1986);  Paul A. Romer, "Endogenous  Technological  Change,"  Journal
of Political Econom]',  Vol 68 (1990);  and Valerie R. Bencivenga  and Bruce D. Smith
"Financial  Intermediation  and Endogenous  Growth,"  Review  of Economic  Studies,  Vol.
s8  (1ee1).s{plaining the slower growth rates in latin  America compared to those in Asia.
Does slower growth caused  by financial repression necessarily  mean lower
welJare?  The answer  is "no"  if one of the main causes  of financial repression  is to
increase inllation  tax revenue as Roubini and Sala-iMartin  argue. The argument that a
repressed  financial system  may enhance  welfare in spite of lower growth rests on the
assumption  that the inflation  tax may be more eflicient than income or excise  taxes. In
the context of moderate inflation, the inflation  tax may be more similar to a lump sum
tax than income  or excise  taxes  in that it may not distort relative  prices  as  much.
However, high and variable inllation  rates may cause  large inflation  and relative price
irntability  so that at high levels of inflatiorl  these arguments  may carry less  weight.
An important implication of Roubini and Sala-i-Martin's  model,  however,  is that
more financial repression  will be associated  with higher  inflation and lower growth.
Interestingly, the lower growth is not a direct outcome of higher inllation  but of financial
repression. Financial  repression  and higher  inflation are then functions  of the
governments  taste or ability for using the (non-distorting) inflation  tax over income and
excise  taxes,
Empirical  evidence,  however, does not favor the public finance motive for
inflationary  finance.'  On the other hand,  the acceleration  in inflation rates  in Latin
-Rudiger  Dornbusch and Stanley Fischer, "Moderate Inflation," NBER  Working
Paper  No.3896 (November  1991)  and Rudiger  Dornbusch,  Federico  Stuzenegger,  and
Holger Wolf, 'Extreme Inflation:  D).namics  and Stabilization," Brookings Papers on
Economic  Activit)r.  No. 2 (1990)..
t4America after the outbreak  of the debt crisis  in 1982  probably  emanated  from the need
to finance extemal and internal obligations with internal resources,  however, and that
this provoked a stong  contraction in the size and efficiency of financial systems.'  The
empirical analysis  in Roubini  and Sala-i-Martin is consistent  with this description.
Nonetheless,  financial development and the recovery of growth have required
substantial  fiscal adjustment  and credible  monetary  and fiscal  policies  to reduce  inflation.
Not only does  the degree  of adjustment  matter but also  the credibility of the policies  put
into place.  Credibility  is a function of a number of variables and is an illusive
commodity.  The fact that adjusfinent in Chile and Mexico and more recently Argentina
has achieved a mark of credibility lalng  the foundation for the region's return to the
international  fi  nancial  scene.
Ihe  New Patterx of Capital Flows to Latin America
Capital has  begun  to flow to Latin America,  1991  marked the beginning  of l,atin
America's  reappearance  on intemational  financial  markets  receiving  around  US$40
billion in-new funds  (Table 4).  Significant  is the change  in the instruments  which
intermediate  this capital flow. A number  of features  of the data  jump from these  tables.
The first is the minimal role commercial bank term lending is taking in financing these
capital  flows except  perhaps  in the case  of Chile. The lack of commercial  bant interest
is natural given the decade long restructuring of Iatin  American bank debt which now
uSee  Welch 'Debt Servicing' and Dornbusch,  Sturzenegger,  and Wolf, 'Extreme
Inflation.'
15seems  to be ending  with Brazil's Brady Plan agreement.
The second  salient  feature  of the capital flow is the importance  of securities  and
stock  issues.  Bonds,  commercial  paper,  and CD issues  accounted  for around  29Vo  of the
total capital  flow in 1991  while American  Depository  Receipts  (ADR) issues  and direct
portfolio  investment in l-atin American stocks accounted  for a notable l6Vo.  The
participation of these securities was very important in all the countries listed above but
to varying  degrees.  For example,  ADRs and portfolio investment  accounted  for a
whopping 28Vo  of the total in Mexico and a more moderate but still large 167o  in
Argentina.
Brazil seems  to be the only country  to have  significantly  tapped  the international
commercial  paper markets. Similarly,  the use  of trade financing  was  much larger in
Brazil than in other countries. These  developments  can  be explained  by Brazil's lack of
an agreement  with international  creditors  so these  highly collateralised  instruments  were
the only avenues  for Brazilian firms to raise  capital. Such  financing  was limited to very
large domestic and multinational  corporations such as Petrobras, Aracruz Cellulose,
Embratel; Alcoa, and IBM  do Brazil.o
Direct  foreign investment was also an important source of capital flows.  Direct
foreign investment through privatisation played significant roles in Argentina and
Venezuela. Foreign  participation  in the privatisations  in 1991  in Brazil and Mexico  was
'Salomon  Brothers, "Private Capital Flows to l-atin America: Volume Triples to
US$40  Billion in 1991,"  Sovereign  Assessment  Group: Emerging  Markets,  February L2
(1992)  and CEPAIj  "El Regreso  de los Palses  latino  Americanos  al Mercado
Internacional  de Capitales  Privados:  Nota Preliminar,"  Comercio  Exterior, (January
1992).
1,6non-existent  while Chile's  privatisation  programme  has  more or less  come  to an end.
These data suggest  that not only domestic financial systems  will  be called upon to
be a source of investment funding but that now stock markets may be called to
intermediate in the recovery of Latin America.  But what can we expect from Latin
American stock markets?  What structural changes  need to occur to allow stock markets
to perform an important role?  I now turn to these questions.
Stock  Markets and the Control of Capital in Latin America
Stock  markets  can  perform three functions:  1) like other financial markets,  stock
markets transfer capital from savers  to investors (the primary market), 2) provide
liquidity  to owners of fixed capital (the secondary  market), and 3) improve the efficiency
and performance of firms through the market for corporate control (the secondary
market). This section  will argue  that stock  markets,  even  in developed  countdes  such  as
the United States  and the United Kingdom,  are not important in funding new
investment. The liquidity of the stock  market is determined  as much  by market access  as
' by all the ingredients in making secondary  a vigorous and effective market for corporate
control.  Stock markets in l-atin America show a low degree of tiquidity.  Thus, by far
the most important role which stock markets can play is to condition the investment
decisions and performance of managers  (3).  Investigating how well I-atin American
markets  for equities  do this is the main purpose  of this section.
Stock  markets  in l-atin America, as  measured  by the ratio of capitalisation  to
GDP, tend to be small compared  with developed  countries  as Table 5 shows. A numberof countries, however, have seen  their stock markets grow substantially in size relative to
their economies  in recent years. The size of Chile's stock market relative to its economy
is now larger than that of the United States  or the United Kingdom.  Mexico's has now
reached  6lVa while Argentina's  has  reached  24Vo. Brazil's stock  market,  which used  to
be the largest stock market in Latin America" has contracted in recent years due to
macroeconomic  instability  and remains  severely  undercapitalised.
Stock markets are not very important in transferring new capital resources  to
firms in either developed countries or in I-atin America.  Table 6 shows  the value of new
issues  as a percentage  of GDP while Table 7 presents  them as a percentage  of gross
fixed investment, In all countries,  the value of new issues  is minor compared  to the
economy and plays a small role in financing investrnent. The size of primary markets for
stocks is small but growing.  If  developed countries are a guide, however, the I-atin
American  primary markets  will not reach  a size  large enough  to be considered  a large
source  of irwestment  resources,
Far more important will be the growth in the secondary  market for stock. If these
rnarkets are to have a significant effect on efficiency and growth, then, these markets will
have  to become  vigorous  markets  for corporate  control. At issue  is whether  the value
and performance of firms can be affected by the type of corporate control.  Although the
early literature  focused on the relation between debt and equity financing more re@nt
literature has  focused  on the agency  problem in the modem corporate  structure  first
18pointed to by Berle and Means.'  As economies  and equity markets  develop,  the
distance between the owners of corporations (the principals) and the individuals who
make the investment  and corporate  strategy  decisions,  the managers  (the agents),  widens.
Hence, the development of common stock corporation creates a well-known principal-
agent problem.
Corporate owners  want to maximise prolits but this may not be the rnain objective
of management. If managers  understand the firm's condition better than owners do,
then managers  may have an incentive to use this difference in inforrnation and lack of
observability  of their actions  to their own benefit. For example,  managers  may have
incentives  to expand  the firm's activities  beyond  its optimum size  especially  if their
personal remuneration increases  because  of the expansion.s Consequently,  firms may
retain cash  flow in excess  of that required to fund all profitable projects. Corporate
owners  should  have  an incentive  to monitor closely  the actions  of managers.
Such a latent demand, however, may not be translated into investment in
monitoring. If ownership  of a firm is widely dispersed,  a free-rider  problem exists." If
'one-owner invests in monitoring managers  and is effective in disciplining management,
tFranco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost  of Capital,  Corporate  Finance,
and the Theory of Investment,"  American Economic  Review,  Vol. 48,  No. 3, (June 1958)
and Adolf A  Berle and Gardiner C. Means,  The Modern Corporation  and Private
Property.  (New York, 1933).
'Michael C. Jensen,  "Agency  Costs  of Free Cash  Flow, Corporate  Finance,  and
Takeovers,"  American Economic  Review,  Yol.76, No.2, (May 1986)  and Michael C,
Jensen,  "Takeovers:  Their Causes  and Consequences,"  Journal of Economic  Perspectives.
VoL 2, No. 2, (Winter 1988).
"Sanford  J. Grossman  and Oliver D. Hart, "Takeover  Bids, the Free-Rider  Problem,
and the Theory of the Corporation,"  The Bell Journal of Economics,  (Spring  1980).then all shareholders  gain.  Typically, the benefit to an individual shareholder, especially
if the free-rider  problem exists,  per unit of monitoring  is lower than the cost  of
monitoring and, hence,  under-investment  in monitoring  will occur.
What could make a diffuse market for corporate control efficient in improving the
performance of firms?  If the market knows about the incentive for under-performance
of certain firms, it will  assign  a low value their stock.  The value of the firm  could
increase if a managerial reform took place and if one stockholder held enough stock to
benefit from monitoring. If a firm's (low) value reflected  diversionary  behaviour  of
managers,  then the firm would be a target for a takeover. The threat of takeover  (or a
cotrtestable  market), by creating  the possibility  of dismissal  or reform of management,
would create  incentives  for managers  to maximise  the value of their firms stock. If they
did otherwise,  they would lose their jobs.
Grossman and Hart  however, show that contestability is not enough to ensure that
managers  maximise  corporate  value.3':  Existing  shareholders  can  gain from a corporate
raider's improvernent of the corporation by not selling their shares  thus limiting  the
raider's  gains  from the takeover. Jenson,  however,  suggests  that if the raider can also
bond free cash  flow by increasing  the leverage  of the firm and increasing  dividend
payments  to shareholders,  the equilibrium increase  in the value of the firm will
compensate  all shareholders.o  Jenson  cites  much  of his own empirical  work to back his
claim that target and raider corporations tend to benefit from (leveraged) takeovers.
'lGrossman  and Hart. 'Takeover  Bids.'
*Jensen,  'Agency  Costs'  and  Jenserl  'Takeovers.'Other ways to improve managerial performance include having managers  and directors
(insiders)  own more of the firm.  Then, the value of insiders  wealth will depend  upon the
value of the firm  mitigating the principal agent problem.
Another  competing hypothesis,  however, posits that too much concentration of
ownership creates both entrenchment and moral hazard problems.  Entrenchment
problems arise when an insider garners enough voting stock to ensure the continuance of
his employment and, with effective control, could divert resources  in a way that does not
maximise  the value of the firm.  Similarly,  moral hazard  problems  arise  in such  a
situation  as the controlling  insider  interest  can  diffuse  risk by issuing  stock  without
significantly diluting effective control.  Stiglitz and Greenwald, Stiglita  and Weiss argue
that this adverse  signal explains why stock markets are not used anywhere as a major
source of equity capital: high risk firms, especially those who are not able to obtain bank
credit,  will be most prone to issue  stock. Hence,  the cost  of equity  financing  will be
prohibitively  high.*
McConnell and Servaes,  building on work by Morck, Schleifer,  and Vishny,
present  empirical evidence  that there is a trade-off  between  the free-rider  problem in
monitoring managers  and entrenchment  of the controlling  interest  as reflected  in the
'Bruce Greenwald,  Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  and Andrew Weiss,  "Informational
Irnperfections  in the Capital Market and Macroeconomic  Fluctuations,"  American
Economic  Review,  Yol.74, No.2, (May 1984); Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Credit Markets and
the Control of Capital,"  Journal of Money.  Credit. and Banking.  Vol. 17,  No. 2, (May
1985); Joseph  E. Stiglitz,  "Why  Financial  Structure  Matters,"  Journal of Economic
Persoectives,  Vol. 2, No. a, @all 1988);  and Joseph  E. Stiglitz,"Government,  Financial
Markets,  and Economic  Development,"  NBER Paper  No. 3669,  (April 1991).
2lvalue of the lirm.-  They find a nonlinear relationship  between  Tobin's Q (the market
value of the firm  relative to book value) and the percentage  of insider ownership. At
low levels  of insider ownership,  monitoring  problems  are high and the value of t}re  stock
is low  As the percentage  of insider  ownership  rises,  the value of the firm rises  until
entrenchment sets in at arcund 407o  to 507a  insider ownership and the value of the stock
begins  to decline.*
I-atin American equities markets suffer from two important problems in its
corporate  ownership  structure:  1) corporate  ownership  is highly entrenched  and 2)
equities  markets  are not contestable.  Private  corporations  are closed  and family
owned."  For example, Brito  and Touriel  show that in a sample of Brazilian firms, the
controlling interest owns around 657o  of the voting shares  and that roughly 70Vo  of the
-John J. McConnell  and Henri Servaes,  "Additional Evidence  on Equity Ownership
and Corporate Value," Journal of Financial Economics  , YoL 27 (1990) and Randall
Morck, Andrei  Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, "Management Ou'nership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis,"  Journal of Financial  Economics,  Vol. 20 (1988). Also
see  Rend Stulz,  "Managerial  Control of Voting Rights:  Financing  Policies  and the
Market foy Corporate  Control,"  Journal of Financial  Economics,  Vol. 20 (1988).
*One should  note that Harold Demsetz  and Kenneth  l-ehn, "The Structure  of
Corporate  Ownership:  Causes  and Consequences,"  Journal of Political Economy,  Vol. 93,
No. 61, (December  1985),  find no evidence  the Berle and Means,  The Modern
Corporation  proposition. Also see  Margaret  Blair, "Who's  in Charge  Here?: How
Changes  in Corporate Finance Are Shaping Corporate Governance,"  The Brookings
Review,  (Fall 1991),  Harold DemsetA  "Corporate  Control, Insider  Trading, and Rates  of
Return,"  American Economic  Review,Yol.76, No. 2, (May 1986).
eThis discussion  is not meant  to underestimate  the abilities of private sector
entrepreneurs in Latin America.  Clearly, the private firms in Argentina, Brazil
(especially  in S4o  Paulo),  Chile and Mexico (especially  in Monterrey) are among  the
most dynarnic in the world.  Their ownership structure, however, developed in a different
context  from the one envisioned  in the reforms  currently  taking place. my arguments,
therefore,  concentrate  on the importance  of corporate  structure  in the new liberalization.administration  of the firms is conprised of members  of the controlling  interest.* These
numbers are very high compared to data on U.S. companies. For example, in Demsetz
and I-ehn's  sample  of 511  U.S. corporations  in 1980-81,  the 20 largest  shareholders
control on average  37.66Va  of the firm and the variance  of their holdings  was  high.'
Also, in a sample  of 1093  U.S.  firms in 1986,  McConnell  and Servaes  find that average
inside  ownership  was 17.847o  (median  of 5Va).* The type of tenure structure  observed
in I-atin American corporations, however, makes sense  in the context of large
macroeconomic  uncertainty  common  to the region. More uncertainty  renders  manager's
activities  less  observable  making a strong  and concentrated  ownership  structure  more
efficient. More diffuse  ownership  is only possible  in an environment  of macroeconomic
stability.
Still, current controlling  interests  in Latin America will likely resist  opening  their
capital. Even after extensive  policies  in the Brazilian capital  markets  to broaden
common  (voting) stock  ownership  in the form of fiscal  incentives,  firms resisted  diluting
control.o' Brazilian firms have  also  resisted  protecting  the interests  of minority
shareholders  and divulging clear and honest information.  I have argued elsewhere  that
such  a view explains  the large concentration  in trading  in state  enterprise  stock on the
*Ney O. Brito, and Hdlio Touriel, "A  Estruture  Empresarial  Brasileira  e a Atuag6o
do BNDE no Mercado  de Capitais,"  Revista  de Administracdo,  Vol, 15,  No. 2 , (June
1e80).
sDemsetz  and I,ehrI,  'The Structure  of Corporate  Ownership.'
{McConnell and Henri Servaes,  'Additional Evidence.'
o'For  a detailed  discussion,  see  Welch Capital Markets,  chapter  4.Brazilian stock markets and why state owned corporations were the most successful  open
capital companies, These corporations protected minority shareholders  rights and
accounting statements  were usually more reliable than private firms. o' This advantage
does not stem from being attached to the government's  budget or from liquidity
advantages. Ness and Novaes show, retums on state enterprise stock are cornmensurate
with their risk level and have the same liquidity  characteristics  as private corporation
stock.4
Rarely does one hear of a takeover in Latin American equity markes  outside
orchestrated  mergers  by governments  of companies  in receivership. One exception  that
comes  to mind is Banco  Garantia's  takeover  of a leading  beverage  company  in Brazil,
Brahma.  Following the takeover, Brahma closed its capitat by exchanging  preferred
stock without voting rights for the remaining common shares  which have voting rights.
Such an operation may have improved ownership control over manageru  at Brahma and
enhanced  its performance but did not help promote widespread ownership in the
Brazilian equities  markets. Aside some  infrequent  exceptions,  l,atin American equities
markets gannot be characterised  as active in takeover activity.
The prospects  for efficient managerial  discipline  by equities  markets  as an
o'Notable exceptions  are Paranapanema  and Souza  Cruz, two private sector
companies  who garner  a significant  share  of the Brazilian Stock  Market.
o'Walter  L. Ness,  "A Empresa  Estatal  no Mercado  de Capitais,"  Revista  Brasileira  de
Mercado  de Capitais,  Vol. 4, No. 12,  (September  - December  1978)  and Ana Dolores
Novaes,  "Rentabilidade  e Risco:  Empresas  Estatais  Zersus  Empresas  Privadas,"  Revista
,YoL.44.,  No. 1,  (January  - March  1990).
24extension  of the labor market for managers  are not bright in the near term.
Nonetheless,  developing  a vigorous  market for control should  be an objective  of policy.
Managers of L.atin American companies  appear not yet familiar  with such discipline.
Recently, Cementos Mexicanos (CEMEX)  acquired shares  in two Spanish  cemenl
concerns.  The price of CEMEX ADRs plunged  as  U.S. and European  stockholders
claimed that they were not properly informed of such plans when the ADRs were issued
earlier this year.  Although CEMEX  managers  are being "punished" for their activities by
ADR markets,  the fall in their stock  value does  not necessarily  make them a target for
takeover  as the percentage  of stocks  traded  on exchanges  in no way threatens  the
controlling  interest.
What other vehicles  can  supplant  an efficient market for corporate  control? One
possibility  comes  from the examples  of Japan  and Germany  where  banks  hold stock  in
the firm.  If the bank takes an ownership position in a firm, the bank will  have an
incentive  to monitor the firms managers  over and above  the monitoring that goes  into
loan contracts. This incentive  increases  the large the bank's  position. Lichtenberg  and
Pushner provide empfuical evidence that in Japan bank holdings of corporate stock
improve the performance  of the firm as  measured  by total factor productivity.* They
also show  that a higher concentration  of corporate  ownership  decreases  productivity.
Their conclusion  is that equity  ownership  by banks  effectively  substitutes  for a
contestable market for corporate control.  Hence, allowing banks to hold equity could
*Fran-k R. Lichtenberg and George M. Pushner,  "Ownership Structure and Corporate
Performance in Japan " NBER Working Paper No. 4092,  (June 7992).effectively rnitigate the shortcomings  of equities markets in I-atin Arnerica.
On the other hand, many feel that the fraud and over-lending to firms and
individuals allied with banls was responsible  in part for the Argentine, Braziliarq
Chilean, Mexica4  and Uruguayan financial collapses. Consequently,  financial
restructuring in I-atin America in the 1.980s  included separation of banks from ownership,
Thus, I-atin American countries have far to go to create capital markets which will
effectively discipline the performance of firms.  This role will  have to be fulfilled  by
product markets. The general  conclusion  which results  is that the gains  from trade and
product market liberalisation will far outweigh the gains from stock market development.
This does  not mean  that Latin America should  not develop  its equities  markets.  As
these  markets  develop,  they will complement  the liberalisation  process  but only in a
supporting  role.
Privatisation,  Liberalisation,  and Capital Markets
Privatisation of public enterprise through divestiture has also taken a central role
in'recent adjustment  progranmes. How can  privatisation  of a state  owned  firm improve
its economic  efficiency? The answers,  oddly enough,  are not clear,  and depend  upon
what objectives  govemment's  have  in taking an ownership  position in enterprise.
Depending  on the character  of internal control structures,  divestiture  may not necessarily
eliminate the principal agent problem.  It only changes  it by changing the objective
26function of the principal.*
If the government ownership of public enterprise leads to purely rent seeking
activities in the firms strategies,  privatisation can improve productive efficiency by
making the principal's objective function profit  maximizing.*  Suppose,  however, that
rent seeking can be thought of as a cost of public ownership. The government may use
an ownership position as an alternative to regulation in affecting prices and output in a
highly concentrated industry to decrease  monopoly rents.  Consequently,  allocative
efficiency  might suffer from privatisation. Hence,  a possible  trade-off may exist  between
allocative and productive efficiency in a divestiture programme depending on the
structure of the market for the final good.  If the industry is highly concentrated, an
optimal level of public ownership will  typically exist.oT
It follows that if a market can  be effectively  liberalised  to both domestic  and
foreign competition,  the raison  d'etre of public enterprise  disappears.  Otherwise,  a
system  of efficient regulation will  have to supplant government ownership.
This line of argument also suggests  that the sequencing  of privatisation and
liberalisadon  is important. It suggests  that privatisation  follows as a logical complement
*For  a review of privatization programs, see  John Vickers and George Yarrow,
"Economic  Perspectives  on Privatization,"  Journal of Economic  Perspectives.  Vol. 5, No.
2, (Spring 1991),  John Vickers and George  Yarro, Privatization:  An Economic  Analysis,
(Cambridge,  1988),  and Robert P. McComb,  "Privatization  in LDCs," mimeo,  Texas  Tech
University (1990).
*The case  where the objective  function includes  employment  targets,  wage  levels,  and
subsidized  pricing of strategic  inputs  to production  is also  consistent  with this conclusion.
depending  upon how society  values  the welfare of the beneficiaries  of these  policies.
"See Robert P. McComb and  John H. Welch,  "Public  Enterprize  and Privatization:
The Importance  of Differential Costs,"  Economia  Mexicana:  Nueva  Epoc4 forthcoming.to liberalisation  and deregulation  of a sector  of the economy, Hence,  a sequence  of
liberalizing the economy then privatizing is a temporally consistent stratery.
Suppose,  however, the government wants to maximise sales  revenue in addition to
improving productive and allocative efficiency.  A trade-off exists  between liberalisation
and revenue maximisation as the price of the firm  at sale will  reflect expected future
profits. An increase  in the degree  of openness  in the sector  will lead to a fall in
expected  profits.  One can imagine, an optimal level of liberalisation which equates  the
marginal benefits to the government from revenue and productive and allocative
efficiency. This policy is not time consistent  as the government  has  the incentive  to then
liberalise  after divestiture.o*
The difference in sequencing  of the reforms may have a bearing on the success  of
the whole progranme.  If liberalisation  is achieved,  the opposition  to privatisation  might
dirninish as the regulatory reasons  for keeping firms in the public fold will  be less. On
the other hand,  if privatisation  precedes  liberalisation,  the newly  privatised  firm will
constitute  a strong  lobby against  further liberalisation. This could subvert  the
'liberalisatiorr component of the programme.  Hence, a government implementing a
liberalisation-cum  -privatisation  scheme  would best  liberalise  first then privatise. In
general,  this is the route chosen  by the Mexicans  and has  proceeded  successfully.
However,  the Brazilian privatisation  scheme  has  led the programme  in a masoeconomic
*A  short formal discussion  of this is available  upon request.
28sense  although  the first industries  privatised  were in competitive  industries.o  Such  a
Thatcherist approach may make liberalisation more difficult  in the future,
These trade-offs are present in the recent bank privatisations in Mexico,  The
average  price to book ratio of the privatisations was on the order of 3.  Many have
argued that these prices are reasonable  as Mexican banks have a comparative advantage
in creating liquidity  in the illiquid  Mexican stock markets, that the planned
modernisafion and investment programmes dictated a large increase in productivity, and
that banks  are much more valuable  as  going  concerns  than as separate  asse$.s.  AII help
explain  these  prices. However,  they  rnay  also  reflect some  expected  protection. Now
that the bank  have  been sold,  the Mexican  government  has  a large  incentive  to open the
financial system,  especially under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The Mexican  stock  market has  been discounting  such  a possibility  since  May but the text
of the NAFTA  does not give strong indications of whether the opening was larger than
expected.  Needless  to say,  Mexican  bank stocks  fell in mid-1992  and continued  to fall
after the announced NAFTA.  However, I should not overstate the importance of the
sequencing  in the Mexican bank privatisation, however, because,  as noted above, the
privatisation  programmes  followed substantial  liberalisation  in product and financial
ooOne  should  note how important the output market structure  is in determining  the
performance  of public enterprise  in Brazil. Ironically,  USIMINAS competed  effectively
in the world steel  market as a public enterprise. Further,  because  of the competitive
nature of this market, the price-book  ratio was  compared  to some  other privatisations.
"Peter M. Garber and Steven  R. Weisbrod,  "Opening  the Financial  Services  Market
in Mexico,"  mimeo, Brown University,  (October 1991).markets  in the last half of the 1980s.
Privatisatioq  if designed  correctly, could improve the performance of stock
markets in that the sale can be structured to minimise entrenchment and also
concentrate ownership (especially among managers)  to leave a high level of monitoring.
In such a scenario, firms which have been traditionally blue-chip should continue to be
so after privatisation and an improvement in performance could increase interest in the
market for equities from both rhe supply and demand sides. Finding the optimal
structure,  however,  is a highly delicate  and daunting  task. Nevertheless,  the privatisation
programmes in Chile and Mexico have clearly incorporated these concerns in the desigrt
of the divestiture. So far the increase  in interest,  however,  has  been mainly on the
demand  side  in secondary  markets.
The lack of contestability in equities markets in I-atin America will  probably not
lead to any  further increases  in productive  efficiency  over and above  those  generated  by
having  owners  which have  interest  closer  to those  of managers  as a result of the
privatisation programmes. Privatisation is important signal a government's commitment
-  'to a liberalisation  programme.  Trade liberalisation,  however,  will provide more
imr:rediate economic benefits than will prograrnmes  of divestiture of state owned
enterprise.
Concluding Remarks
In trying to touch on the important issues  which will dictate  the future role and
performance  of capital  markets,  I omitted a discussion  of many of the institutional
30reforms  which need  to take place. A proper treatment  would address  such  topics  as
disclosure by firms, external audits, bank capital requirements, policy on writing down
bad debt, and loan portfolio  classification systems. Improvements in monitoring and
regulation will  improve the performance and growth of financial and equities markets.
Certainly, all of these issues  need to be addressed  by the governments of Latin American
counlries  but a full discussion  is outside  the scope  of this paper and can  be found
elsewhere.'l Suffice it to say that many l-atin American countries, especially Chile and
Mexico, have moved to improve the financial environment by improving information  and
regulation of the participants of the financial system. Still, I have endeavored  to
highlight the obstacles  which fall outside of the regulatory realm facing Latin American
countries in trying to make the markets for corporate control and credit dynamic and
efficient in leading  economic  recovery.
At the heart of the discussion  is the feeling  that the corporate  and financial
structure of I-arin American firms will  have to change. Owners will  have to be willing  to
dilute some  control to increase  their capital  base. Regulators  and firms will have  to
disseminate  information efficiently  and broadly  to dispel  any suspicion  potential doubts
about the running of the firma and the motives of management. The result will  be a
more dynamic  productive  structure  which will assimilate  new technologies  as  quickly as
possible  and better adapt  to changes  in macro and microeconomic  structures. Progress
in Mexico and in Chile is encouraging  but is still draggrng  at the corporate  level. As
"For good treatments,  see  Morris et al, "I-atin America's  Banking  Systems,"  and
World Bank, World Development  Report 1989,
JIthese  economies  learn the implications  of having  an open economic  structure,  the better
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